Cập nhật: 11:29 GMT - thứ hai, 19 tháng 12, 2011
Ông Hồ Chí Minh và Kim Nhật Thành ở Bình Nhưỡng năm 1957
BBC - Hai nước cộng sản Việt
Nam và Bắc Hàn có mối quan hệ thân thiết lâu đời và Cộng hòa Dân chủ
Nhân dân Triều Tiêu (Bắc Hàn) là một trong những nước đầu tiên thiết
lập quan hệ ngoại giao với nước Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa ngay từ năm
1950.
Phải đến năm 2000, 25 năm sau ngày
chiến tranh Việt Nam kết thúc, Bắc Hàn và Việt Nam mới lần đầu tiên xác
nhận - như tin đồn đã có từ lâu - rằng phi công Bắc Hàn đã tham chiến
chống các cuộc tấn công không quân của Hoa Kỳ tại miền Bắc Việt Nam.
Báo Tuổi Trẻ năm 2007 tiết lộ vào năm 2002, 14 phi công Bắc Hàn bị giết trong chiến tranh và được chôn ở tỉnh Bắc Giang - hài cốt của họ nay được đưa về lại Bắc Hàn.
Trong lá thư gửi tờ báo để đính chính một số chi tiết, một viên tướng về hưu của Việt Nam cho hay 87 người lính Bắc Hàn đã phục vụ ở Việt Nam từ 1967 đến đầu 1969. 14 người được phong liệt sĩ và các chiến binh Bắc Hàn được nói đã bắn rơi 26 máy bay Mỹ.
Tư liệu mới
Báo chí Việt Nam từng đăng hình về các quân nhân Bắc Triều Tiên thời chiến tranh Mỹ - Việt
Ông Merle L. Pribbenow, cựu nhân viên CIA và nay là một nghiên cứu gia độc lập, dịch sang tiếng Anh hai tài liệu lấy từ văn bản chính thức của Việt Nam.
Hoa Kỳ quan tâm đến chuyện này vì đây là lần duy nhất kể từ sau Cuộc Chiến Triều Tiên, quân đội miền Bắc cộng sản của Triều Tiên "giao tranh trực tiếp" với quân Mỹ.
Các sử gia nước ngoài thì ch́u ý đến tài liệu này như một bằng chứng cuộc chiến Việt Nam bị quốc tế hóa cả về phe cộng sản.
Theo Bấm tài liệu này, ngày 21/9/1966, Đại tướng Võ Nguyên Giáp đồng ý về yêu cầu của Bình Nhưỡng muốn gửi một đơn vị không quân tình nguyện sang Việt Nam chiến đấu.
Đơn vị này sẽ "tổ chức thành từng đại đội nằm trong đội hình trung đoàn không quân của ta, mặc quân phục Việt Nam, cùng sử dụng một sân bay".
Theo văn bản cuộc họp, Đại tướng Võ Nguyên Giáp kết luận: "Bộ đội không quân Triều Tiên mang danh nghĩa là chuyên gia, nhưng thực chất là quân tình nguyện. Vì vậy, ta phải đoàn kết tôn trọng bạn, nhưng phải giữ vững chủ quyền."
"Trong quá trình huấn luyện và chiến đấu, ta cần chỉ rõ phạm vi hoạt động của bạn, chỉ định sân bay chính, sân bay dự bị. Trong chỉ huy, ta là cấp trên của bạn, nhưng tại trung đoàn bạn sẽ trực tiếp chỉ huy, có đại diện của ta để giao nhiệm vụ."
"Đại tướng yêu cầu hiệp đồng giữa hai bên phải rõ ràng, rành mạch để tránh những phức tạp không đáng có về sau."
Đến cuối tháng Chín tại Hà Nội, hai bên ký nghị định thư, theo đó:
"Phía Triều Tiên sẽ cử sang Việt Nam số chuyên gia đủ để phụ trách 1 đại đội máy bay MiG17 của Việt Nam (đại đội gồm 10 chiếc máy bay). Cuối năm 1966 hoặc đầu năm 1967, khi phía Việt Nam chuẩn bị đủ máy bay, phía Triều Tiên sẽ đưa sang Việt Nam số chuyên gia đủ để phụ trách đại đội MiG17 thứ hai của Việt Nam."
Có tư liệu nói quân Bắc Triều Tiên vào cả chiến trường phía Nam (ảnh minh họa về cuộc chiến Mỹ - Việt)
Có mặt ở miền Nam Việt Nam?
Trung tâm nghiên cứu Woodrow Wilson còn công bố một văn bản của Bộ Ngoại giao Romania ngày 6/7/1967, do Eliza Gheorghe dịch sang tiếng Anh, đưa ra thông tin người của Bắc Hàn có mặt cả ở miền Nam Việt Nam trong giai đoạn chiến tranh.
Bức điện tường thuật cuộc gặp của một người thuộc Mặt trận Dân tộc Giải phóng miền Nam Việt Nam và nhân viên ngoại giao của Romania ở Bình Nhưỡng.
Nhà ngoại giao người Việt cho hay nhiều nhân viên Bắc Hàn đã có mặt ở miền Nam Việt Nam.
Ông này nói: "Họ hoạt động ở những khu vực nơi lính Nam Hàn có mặt, để nghiên cứu chiến thuật của chúng, khả năng sẵn sàng chiến đấu và tinh thần của lính Nam Hàn, và tuyên truyền chống lại phía Nam Hàn."
Theo bức điện, Sứ quán Bắc Hàn ở Hà Nội là nơi điều phối các hoạt động của lính Bắc Hàn tại miền Nam Việt Nam.
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North Korea International Documentation Project
NKIDP e-Dossier No. 2: North Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam
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North Korean Pilots in North Vietnam in 1968. Image source Tuổi Trẻ Cuối tuần, http://tuoitre.vn
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Introduction
In 2000, twenty-five years after the Vietnam War ended, both North Korea and Vietnam admitted for the first time that, as had long been rumored but never before officially confirmed, North Korean pilots had flown in combat against U.S. aircraft over North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. No further details of North Korea’s involvement were provided, however, and subsequently very little information has been provided. An official Vietnamese military history published in 2001 contained only the following general statement: “Under the terms of an agreement between Korea and Vietnam, in 1967 a number of pilots from the Korean People’s Liberation Army were sent to Vietnam to provide us training and the benefit of their experience and to participate in combat operations alongside the pilots of the People’s Army of Vietnam. On a number of flights Korean pilots scored victories by shooting down American aircraft.”[1] Vietnamese military histories usually refer only to an unidentified regimental-sized flying unit called “Group Z” [Doan Z]. Except in a few isolated instances, these histories provide no information about the exact size, composition, or activities of the mysterious “Group Z,” except that it was based at Kep Airfield northeast of Hanoi from early 1967 through 1968. An article published in a Vietnamese newspaper in August 2007 reported that in 2002 the bodies of the 14 North Korean Air Force personnel killed during the Vietnam War had been buried in a cemetery in Vietnam’s Bac Giang Province and had been disinterred and repatriated to North Korea. In a letter to the newspaper to correct several mistakes made in the original article, a retired North Vietnamese major general who had worked with the North Koreans revealed that a total of 87 North Korean Air Force personnel had served in North Vietnam between 1967 and early 1969, during which time the North Koreans had lost 14 men and had claimed to have shot down 26 American aircraft.[2]
According to the documents below, taken from an official People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) historical publication, on 21 September 1966 an official North Korean request to be allowed to send a North Korean Air Force regiment to help defend North Vietnam against U.S air attacks was officially reviewed and approved by the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Central Military Party Committee, chaired by General Vo Nguyen Giap. During subsequent discussions held 24-30 September 1966 between a PAVN delegation headed by the Chief of the PAVN General Staff and a North Korean military delegation headed by the Chief of the North Korean General Staff, a detailed agreement was worked out for the dispatch of a North Korean Air Force contingent to fight in North Vietnam. The agreement stipulated that the North Koreans would provide pilots for one North Korean Air Force regiment consisting of two companies (ten aircraft each) of MiG-17s and one company of MiG-21s, while Vietnam would provide the aircraft and all necessary technical equipment, maintenance, and logistics support for the North Korean flyers. The agreement included a timetable for the phased arrival of the individual North Korean flight companies and specified that the North Korean units would operate under the command and control of the North Vietnamese Air Defense Command.
Merle L. Pribbenow graduated from the
University of Washington in 1968 with a bachelor's degree in political
science. He then joined the CIA and served in South Vietnam as a
Vietnamese language specialist for five years (1970-1975). He is now an
independent researcher/author specializing in the Vietnam War.
Footnotes
[1]. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Lich su khang chien chong My, cuu nuoc, 1954-1975, Tap V: tong tien cong va noi day 1968 [History
of the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation,
1954-1975, Volume V: The 1968 General Offensive and Uprising], People’s
Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2001, page 271.[back]
[2]. Tuoi Tre Weekend Edition, 17 August 2007 (http://tuoitre.vn/Tuoi-tre-cuoi-tuan/273979/14-chien-binh-Trieu-Tien-tren-bau-troi-Viet-Nam.html) and Tuoi Tre online newspaper, 28 August 2007 (http://www.tuoitre.com.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=275879&ChannelID=119) [back]
General Vo Nguyen Giap’s Decision On North Korea’s Request to Send a Number of Pilots to Fight in Vietnam
21 September 1966
During a meeting of the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Military Party Committee, Comrade Phung The Tai, the Commander of the Air Defense-Air Force Command, reported that our allies had requested permission to send a volunteer air force unit to fight in Vietnam. The request stated that their personnel would be organized into individual companies that would be integrated into our air force regiments, that they would wear our uniforms, and that they would operate from the same airfields as our air force. Our allies said that they could send a large number of technical [support] personnel but that we would be totally responsible for providing ground technical support and for providing supplies for their unit.
After a discussion by the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Military Party Committee, as the presiding officer Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap reached the following decision: The North Korean air force personnel would be called “specialists” but in reality they would be volunteer soldiers. For that reason, we had to agree to respect our allies but at the same time we had to maintain our own sovereignty. During the course of their training and combat operations, we had to clearly delineate their area of operations and assign them both a primary and an alternate airfield. With regard to command arrangements, we would be their superiors, but within the allied [North Korean] regiment they would directly command their own forces with the assistance of representatives from our side, who would give them their specific operational missions. General Giap demanded that coordination arrangements between the two sides must be very clear and precise to avoid any unfortunate complications in the future.
Signing of a Protocol Agreement for North Korea
to Send a Number of Pilots to Fight the American Imperialists during the
War of Destruction against North Vietnam
30 September 1966
Following the agreement in principle between the Labor Party of Vietnam and the Korean Workers’ Party, to implement the guidance issued by the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Military Party Committee on 21 September, from 24 to 30 September 1966 Vietnamese military representatives led by Chief of the General Staff Van Tien Dung and North Korean military representatives led by Chief of the General Staff Choi Kwang held talks in an atmosphere of honesty and sincerity and then signed a protocol agreement covering the following six concrete points:
1. - In late October or during November 1966 North Korea would send Vietnam enough specialists to man a Vietnamese MiG-17 company (a company consisted of ten aircraft). In late 1966 or early 1967, after Vietnam had prepared sufficient aircraft, North Korea would send enough specialists to Vietnam to man a second Vietnamese MiG-17 company. During 1967, after North Korea finished preparing specialists and after Vietnam was able to prepare sufficient aircraft, North Korea would send to Vietnam sufficient specialists to man one Vietnamese MiG-21 company.
2. - To facilitate internal administration and combat command, the North Korean specialists would be organized into individual companies, and eventually into a regiment. Prior to the formation of the regiment, the North Korean specialist companies would be assigned to a Vietnamese air force regiment and would be deployed to that regiment’s airfields.When the Korean side had its full complement of three flying companies, a North Korean regiment would be organized and the regiment would be assigned its own separate airfield.
3. - The specialist companies assigned to the Vietnamese air force regiment would be subordinate to the regiment headquarters and would be under the guidance and direction of Vietnam’s Air Defense-Air Force Command.
4. - Coordination between air force units and between the air force and anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile units would be carried out under the guidance and direction of Vietnam’s Air Defense-Air Force Command.
5. - All command and technical support, such as communications and technical support and maintenance of the aircraft would be provided by the Vietnamese side.
6. - North Korea would provide the basic technical and tactical training to the specialists in North Korea. After their arrival in Vietnam, Vietnam would only provide them with the on-the-job training necessary to adapt to the battlefield conditions, weather conditions, and their battle opponents.
In addition, the protocol also laid out the agreement on providing housing, living supplies, transportation equipment, medical support, policy regulations [death, injury, sickness, discipline], and commendations and awards.
[2]. Tuoi Tre Weekend Edition, 17 August 2007 (http://tuoitre.vn/Tuoi-tre-cuoi-tuan/273979/14-chien-binh-Trieu-Tien-tren-bau-troi-Viet-Nam.html) and Tuoi Tre online newspaper, 28 August 2007 (http://www.tuoitre.com.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=275879&ChannelID=119) [back]
Document 1
Excerpt from The General Staff During the Resistance War Against the United States, 1954-1975: Chronology of Events (Biên niên sự kiện BTTM trong KCCM 1954-1975),
official People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) publication. Obtained and
translated for NKIDP by Merle Pribbenow. Accessed 30 November 2011 at http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,5366.0.html
21 September 1966
During a meeting of the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Military Party Committee, Comrade Phung The Tai, the Commander of the Air Defense-Air Force Command, reported that our allies had requested permission to send a volunteer air force unit to fight in Vietnam. The request stated that their personnel would be organized into individual companies that would be integrated into our air force regiments, that they would wear our uniforms, and that they would operate from the same airfields as our air force. Our allies said that they could send a large number of technical [support] personnel but that we would be totally responsible for providing ground technical support and for providing supplies for their unit.
After a discussion by the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Military Party Committee, as the presiding officer Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap reached the following decision: The North Korean air force personnel would be called “specialists” but in reality they would be volunteer soldiers. For that reason, we had to agree to respect our allies but at the same time we had to maintain our own sovereignty. During the course of their training and combat operations, we had to clearly delineate their area of operations and assign them both a primary and an alternate airfield. With regard to command arrangements, we would be their superiors, but within the allied [North Korean] regiment they would directly command their own forces with the assistance of representatives from our side, who would give them their specific operational missions. General Giap demanded that coordination arrangements between the two sides must be very clear and precise to avoid any unfortunate complications in the future.
Document 2
Source: Vietnam Ministry of
Defense Central Archives, Central Military Party Committee Collection,
File No. 433. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Merle Pribbenow.
30 September 1966
Following the agreement in principle between the Labor Party of Vietnam and the Korean Workers’ Party, to implement the guidance issued by the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Military Party Committee on 21 September, from 24 to 30 September 1966 Vietnamese military representatives led by Chief of the General Staff Van Tien Dung and North Korean military representatives led by Chief of the General Staff Choi Kwang held talks in an atmosphere of honesty and sincerity and then signed a protocol agreement covering the following six concrete points:
1. - In late October or during November 1966 North Korea would send Vietnam enough specialists to man a Vietnamese MiG-17 company (a company consisted of ten aircraft). In late 1966 or early 1967, after Vietnam had prepared sufficient aircraft, North Korea would send enough specialists to Vietnam to man a second Vietnamese MiG-17 company. During 1967, after North Korea finished preparing specialists and after Vietnam was able to prepare sufficient aircraft, North Korea would send to Vietnam sufficient specialists to man one Vietnamese MiG-21 company.
2. - To facilitate internal administration and combat command, the North Korean specialists would be organized into individual companies, and eventually into a regiment. Prior to the formation of the regiment, the North Korean specialist companies would be assigned to a Vietnamese air force regiment and would be deployed to that regiment’s airfields.When the Korean side had its full complement of three flying companies, a North Korean regiment would be organized and the regiment would be assigned its own separate airfield.
3. - The specialist companies assigned to the Vietnamese air force regiment would be subordinate to the regiment headquarters and would be under the guidance and direction of Vietnam’s Air Defense-Air Force Command.
4. - Coordination between air force units and between the air force and anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile units would be carried out under the guidance and direction of Vietnam’s Air Defense-Air Force Command.
5. - All command and technical support, such as communications and technical support and maintenance of the aircraft would be provided by the Vietnamese side.
6. - North Korea would provide the basic technical and tactical training to the specialists in North Korea. After their arrival in Vietnam, Vietnam would only provide them with the on-the-job training necessary to adapt to the battlefield conditions, weather conditions, and their battle opponents.
In addition, the protocol also laid out the agreement on providing housing, living supplies, transportation equipment, medical support, policy regulations [death, injury, sickness, discipline], and commendations and awards.
